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Abstract. Property rights represent one of the most significant structural determiners of 
efficiency in economic system. Regarding this fact, their content influences the 
institutional, legal and distribuitive sphere, their effect on economic performances in 
national economy is complex and substantial. Specific characteristics related to social 
and economic characteristics of a right holder, making adequate incentives, more 
complete evaluation, their individuality, exclusivity and free tranferability, combinatory 
effect, specialisation, productivity, social compactness and organizational complexity, 
caused private property rights to influence considerable economic potential. Mechanisms 
for achieving that refer to enabling trade, boosting market and competition forces, 
reduction of transaction costs and providing adequate motivation for economic agents. 
Imperfection of political process and the resulting political institutions represent the main 
causes of inefficient protection and enforcement of private property rights. Specific 
historical experiencies in developing different national economies distinctly confirm their 
indesputable characteristics in making national economy to work efficiently and in 
providing high level of long term economic development and growth. 
Key Words: private property rights, formal institutions, economic efficiency, imperfect 
political institutions, economic history. 
INTRODUCTION 
Changes and efforts directed towards establishing market economies in former 
socialistic countries, attempts of building up an adequate institutional structure and 
performing institutional changes directed towards the establishment of functional market 
economy in the rest of developing countries represent the most signifficant characteristic 
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of contemporary economic history. Divergent results of these countries, as well as their 
relative stagnation in comparison with the developed market economies or too slow 
process of convergency, require the reconsideration of mainstream theoretical positions, 
that were used as and that were actually the explanation background for the developing 
policy. Traditional approaches and economic growth modeling, based on neoclassical, 
recource based interpretation of economic growth, failed in giving adequate answers for 
drafting and implementing the appropriate strategies. All these models and approaches 
could not give substantial answer to the fundamental questions, reffering to the economic 
growth determination, i.e. what the fundamental causes for economic growth are? Factors 
used in these models, such as innovations, economy size, education, capital accumulation 
and so on are not the growth causes. They are growth [35, p. 2]. 
In order to remove the disadvantages and interpret the economic reality in a more 
suitable way, a specific approach has been developed for interpreting economic dynamic 
within New institutional economy. This approach referes to the Theory of property rights 
which emphasises the necessary conditions for achieving economic efficiency. Property 
rights represent unique epitheon ornans of the whole institutional structure and make the 
core of the economic process, that results in economic growth. This theory emphasizes 
that the rights, not the resources, are owned by economic agents [2, p. 17]. Because of 
this the rights are the subject of exchange on the market and the base for making 
investments and organizing production. For that reason, if we wish to understand the 
economic process properly and the causes of economic growth we have to redirect our 
attention towards the property rights institutions, not towards the physical subject of 
property rights. Property rights and the institutions in general are considered to be so 
called “deep determiners of economic growth” and the most powerful explanation and 
fundamental cause of economic growth in Western Europe [7, p. 140]. 
Clearly defined and effciently enforced property rights do not only directly influence 
the quality of exchange and the volume of transactions in national economy, but can be 
observed as a unique mechanism for transfering various characteristics of economic, 
social and political system on economic efficiency, such as competition, finacial institutions, 
the rule of law, quality of bureaucracy or a trust. For that reason, pivotal aim of this work 
is identification of basic dimensions related to property rights, as well as mechanisms for 
transmitting the influences of property rights on economic efficiency. Beside it, the aim is 
to identify the influences coming from institutions of political system which are crucial in 
determing their clarity and features of their implementation. Thus, we can say that the 
elementary premise of our paper refers to the proposition that clearly defined and 
consistently enforced property rights are representing the decesive reguirement for efficient 
functioning of national economy. 
Qualitative methodology research has been used in our research. It has been modified 
according to the specific subject and the aim of the paper. Constructional elements of 
methodology approach refer to the usage of comparative and historical method. This 
implies the analysis of the results of the numerous empiric and theoretic studies which 
were conducted in order to discover and explain complex linkages between the property 
rights and economic efficiency. 
The work consists of five parts, beside the introduction and the conclusion. The first 
part is devoted to the analysis of the nature and basic dimensions characterizing the 
property rights institutions. The second part referes to the identification of specific traits 
of private property rights that make them superior property regime in terms of efficiency 
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compared to the other alternatives. In the third part the focus is on the identification of 
the main mechanisms through which the private property rights influence economic 
performance. Specific influences of political institutions in determining the clearty and 
effective protection property rights protection are the subject of analysis in the fourth 
part. In tha last, fifth section particular historical experiences are stated that were a 
milestone in the development of certain national economies. The conclusion gives 
reflections on the summary results of the previous parts, and points to the possible 
directions of future researches. 
1. MULTIDIMENSIONAL NATURE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Considering the fact that the rules of property rights are among the most significant 
structural determiners of economic behaviour and performances [26, p. 143], it is 
necessary to indicate the complex nature of this concept. In that way, the multiple 
influences they produce on economic efficiency are indirectly emphasized.  
Bearing in mind the legal origin of property rights concept, as well as the fact that the 
prevailing volume of contemporary institutional structure is determined by legal 
framework, legal perspective is being solicited as unavoidable in determining the substance 
of this institutional category. In that sense, property rights refer to the right to use goods – 
uzus, the right to earn the income from the goods – uzus fructus, the right of suffering the 
concequences, positive or negative, of the change in value of the goods – abusus, as well as 
the right on alienation of the goods, i.e. ius abutendi [20, p. 11]. In other words, the set of 
property rights refers to the exclusive right of an owner to use the property, to make an 
income and to administer the property, as well as to transfer control onto another person 
[15, p. 86]. It is evident, according to the given specification of property rights, that 
generally speaking property does not only imply „the right“ over a certain resource, but the 
whole set of regulatory rights carried through the legal means. Understood in this way, 
property rights as well as the rules related to property aim to set up the allocation of 
resources towards the most productive uses [4, pp. 51-53]. Possible problems in each of 
these segments may cause huge consequences on economic performances in national 
economy. 
The analysis of the property rights from the perspective of institutional economics 
indicates that they represent the rights of the individual against certain goods and with it 
related economically, legally or socailly restricted possibility to consume certain property in 
any way, i.e. directly through consumption or indirectly through exchange [14, p. 99]. For 
that reason, the property rights can be understood as the rights including both formal 
regulations (enactments and legislatives) and characteristics of their enforcement, as well as 
social norms and the attitudes of members of a certain community with respect to what 
constitutes desirable social model [13]. The full effect of the property rights on the 
economic growth and unihibited market exchange can be expacted only if all the elements 
of a social context are fully complient with the requirements of a particular property rights 
regime. Although being obvious, they do not depend only upon the government-run 
institutional system, but upon the customs, reciprocity and the spontaneous restrictions as 
well [27, p. 52]. 
 Another specific approach in observing property rights highlights their functional 
character and economic content at the organizational level. In this regard, property 
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represents a powerful mean seen as a participation in decision-making proccess or a basis 
for participating in formulating and enforcement of decisions. Therefore, having the 
ownership of a resource means that one have his interests defined and protected as a 
property, which gives him the right to participate in economic decision-making [39, p. 3]. 
In circumstances of inadequately specificated or poorly implemented rights, the very 
process (individual or organizational) of decision-making would be burdened with 
inefficiencies and concequently poor economic performances. 
If we emphasize the distributive aspect as a criterion in property rights content 
analysis, we could say that the property is a substantial indicator for a bundle of relations 
between the real and the potential income flow, or for different levels of consumption 
between the holders of the rights and those who are not [40, p. 224]. This is a libertarian 
and Smithian interpretation of the content and implications of the property rights system, 
which emphasizes the difference between the real– caused by government activities, and 
potential– which would be determined by market forces, distribution of particular 
property rights regime. State influence is not only seen in how clear and in what size the 
property rights will be defined, but also in additional influence on tax policy or regulatory 
activities of its organizations [9, p. 44]. For that reason, efficient economic process 
demands coordination in all the activities governed by the state, so that property rights 
could be fully protected. In those circumstances is to be expected that exchange and 
investments achieve high levels. 
Judging by the previous analysis of specific dimensions in property rights, though 
only partially, it is obvious that they exert strong influence on economic efficiency. 
Regarding pretty complex content and different dimensions of property rights, there are 
apparently more breaking points through which they could exercise restrictive influence 
on economic activity. 
2. SUPREMACY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS FROM INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
The question of the relationship of property rights and economic efficiency involves a 
review of those essential features which make private property rights have significant 
advantages in stimulating economic activity against alternative forms of ownership. This 
is particularly evident if we look back to the emergence of private property rights. In fact, 
only with the change of ownership toward private property has been made a significant 
step in the development and adaptation of new production methods and means that are 
used in production. The general conclusion to be reached is that the incentives through 
which private ownership influences the behavior of economic agents, are the source of 
the rapid progress in material production, beginning from the Neolithic era period up to 
modern civilization [25]. 
Various inducements and their effects on allocative efficiency are the result of social 
and economic characteristics of property right holders. It is caused by the fact that state 
and private owners usually react on incentives from various fields. In that sense, 
according to fundamental characteristics of political system, the state mainly reacts to 
broader political and social factors, whereas private owners activities are primarily led by 
market forces [2, p. 22]. 
Another reason why private property is seen as a superior mode of ownership within 
the institutional economics consists in the fact that individuals appreciate more carefully 
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some goods if they are holding it. Private property enables responsible protection and 
motivates the owner to make it useful, in the most profitable way. Private property is an 
essential component in market mechanism functioning, because it increases profitability, 
sale and usefulness of capital usage [23, p. 22]. 
Within the theory of property rights is the dominant view that an effective system of 
property rights means that it should have three important features. In fact, what is needed 
is to be an individual, to be freely transferable and to be exclusive [16; 20; 25]. It seems 
obvious that, in regards to all the three dimensions (especially to the first and the third), 
private property represents the preferable pattern in terms of efficiency. 
The following cause for transformation toward private property and its predominance in 
economic system in contemporary economies, refers to the combination of productivity 
increase, i.e. specialization and social compactness. In relations to that, it can be added that 
systems based on high level of compactness have lower significance in modern economies, 
whereas modern economies in relations to its historical alternatives have become far more 
productive. The causes of higher productivity in contemporary economies are dual in 
nature. They are based on technological changes and specialization [10]. An especially 
significant aspect of specialization is its subverting effect on compactness. This makes 
additional pressure on the efficiency of the system, which is based on collective (political) 
decision-making. 
With regard to the social compactness, it should be noted that this aspect relates to the 
issue of connectivity or "closeness" that exists among the members of a certain community 
or a group. Thereat, the familiarity or connection may be biological, but geographic and 
social as well. If the compactness among them exists, cultural norms are of high 
significance, interaction among people can be identified, and its effects are well predictable, 
because all the future and past results of interaction are estimated and visible. For example, 
a small community, both geographically and by population, whose residents remain most of 
their life within it, is the environment in which collective decision-making makes sense and 
could be highly efficient. But in the west economies developed after the medieval era, the 
production was on a large scale for unknown customers on market transcending a relatively 
narrow biological, geographical and social entities. This has undermined the efficiency of 
collective decision-making. Market exchange became responsitive to market signals largely 
coming from personal goals of impersonal economic agents on the market. It had enormous 
consequences on system efficiency. Systems based on collective decision making, 
following the principles of non-market resources allocation, would not be capable of 
solving the problem of efficient resource usage in the same way as the systems that are 
relying on the prices which are reflecting the objective facts that are commonly known [10, 
pp. 661- 662]. 
Organizational complexity, as a special factor flavoring economic system organization 
predominately based on private property is also connected with specialization. Namely, 
higher specialization leads to emphasized organizational complexity, whereas coordinate 
problems, appearing in such conditions, are demanding a system capable of providing 
continuous coordination of activities in a satisfactory manner. In modern economies, the 
most adequate system that provides it, is the price system. In order for this system to work, 
it must have the support of the social and legal structures that are providing trust and 
support to the enforcement of transactions. Legal institutions, defining private property 
and dictating the exchange, have to be very operative so that organizational complexity, 
as intrinsic specialization consequence, could lead to higher productivity [10, p. 664-
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665]. Problems in organizational structure, appearing as complexity consequence, can be 
surpassed in the most adequate manner, within private property right regime, because 
only within this property regime an adequate functioning of market mechanism and its 
efficiency can be achieved. 
The interaction between distorsion of social compactness, specialization (productivity) and 
organisational complexity caused essential and very dynamic property transformations at the 
end of XX century. Specialization has played a prevalent role in this relation. Namely, by 
decreasing compactness and increasing productivity and organizational complexity, it enabled 
and caused transformation of contemporary economic systems towards regimes dominantly 
based on private property. Some authors, for example Demzetz, empasize that specialization 
promotes development of complex and dependant economy, which in order to be efficient, 
must be based on a dominant degree of private property over the resources [10, p. 671].  
In spite of the fact that the institutions of private property rights are labeled without an 
atribute „social“, they are very valid and significant in social manner. The reason for their 
existence is in a good way the result of their convinience in discovering social values and 
this value judgements are used as basis for formulating possible solutions for the lack of 
resources. In this context, we could note that even in a hypothetical society where work is 
observed as a desired activity, and therefore no need for incentives to work exists, it 
would be necessary to evaluate various alternative outputs which can be produced. This 
means that it would be needed to precisely and clearly define property rights as 
prerequisite for efficient resource allocation [11, p. 18]. 
Finally, it is necessary to emphasize one more argument in favour of private ownership. 
Namely, if the state activities are directed towards protection and property rights 
enforcement, at least one party in transaction will be interested to help the state in 
implementing these rights. In that sense, institutional frame based on regime or predominant 
regime of private property rights will mainly result in efficinet transactions, because there 
are no incentives by the state not to respect property rights, and at the same time there is 
immanent concern of each private party that its activities will be additionally monitored and 
evaluated by the independent instance in case of abuse. On the other hand, deviations from 
efficient transactions are more likely if one party in transaction appears from public domain, 
whereas possible ineffficiecies may be multiple – from asset stripping to infringing the 
private property rights. 
3. MAIN MECHANISMS BY WHICH PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS INFLUENCE ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Institutional theory emphasizes that availability and productivity of resources is 
determined by institutional and political characteristics of environment. Although there are 
certain incompatibilities regarding qualities of the institutions dominantly determining 
economic efficiency, there is still consensus regarding the fact that property rights have a 
strong impact on economic growth. Based upon that restrictions in exchange and use of 
resources should be minimal [21, p. 206]. 
Property rights, as a theoretic concept, have deep historical roots in philosophy, which is 
generally the basic characteristic of economic science. Namely, the very concept of economic 
logics is based on the property contemplation, although in theoretic constructions (especially 
in economic sense) it has been pretty indirectly considered. Helenic and Medieval 
philosophers, such as Aristotel and Thomas Aquinas, emphasized variety of property 
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characteristics, especially the feature of enabling freedom for the owners. Central function of 
the property is inspiring people to invest care and effort in the things that are in their 
ownership. Classical economic philosophers and economists in the XVII and XVIII century, 
out of which John Lock and Jeremy Bentham are especially important, were particularly 
focused on this, according to them, central function of the ownership, and stressed it as the 
central object in considering the property right matters. They pointed out that individuals 
would be motivated in making effort, investments and careful management because of 
ownership. In consequence of this behaviour the ownership will encourage wealth production. 
This point of view is equal to one of the basic postulates in the property rights theory. It 
consists of the claim that behavioural patterns of individuals, thanks to the adequatly 
determined incentives through private ownership, will influence the property rights 
distribution towards the most productive uses [18, p. 61]. The outcome of such production is 
not only useful for the individuals, but for the society as a whole. 
Contemporary economic theory indicates an additional aspect of property. Due to the fact 
that the property identifies who owns what, trade is made possibile. In turn, trade encourages 
specialization by awarding an individual's effort with enlarging its personal ownership, 
creating something Smith regarded as „the wealth of nation“ [38, p. 209]. Besides the 
phylosophical, property rights have deep sociological origins as well. In that sense, according 
to the premise emphasized by Max Weber, ascetical working ethic (so-called „calvinismus“), 
rational political and social order, reliable (i.e. clear) and transparent ownership system are 
the necessary and the most signifficant aspects that should be satistied in order to make 
development based on capitalistic-market system possible [41, p. 106]. 
Additional channels of property rights influences on economic efficacy are realised 
through complicated array of economic and social mechanisms. By creating and stimulating 
the possibility for saving goods value property rights stimulate responsible behaviour 
contributing to efficiency enhancement. They increase motivation for the increase in value 
of goods and through that fact spur the investments. They do not only provide direct 
incentives for investments, but also the property holders are in position to use the owned 
object as colateral in the lending process. Finally, property rights extend market size in a 
way that they enable and motivate a larger number of investors to compete for the 
ownership of goods [3, p. 105]. 
Property rights quality, primarilly reflected through the rule of law and property rights 
protection, influences the efficiency of the economic system in the following ways. On the 
first level, secure property rights reduce uncertainty, and thus encourage investment activity 
of companies. On the other hand, property rights a have huge impact on the long-term 
investments into physical and human capital. If the property rights of investments and its 
expected returns are perceived as sufficently secure, there is a growth of long term 
technologically intensive investments in capital with higher additional value. In the opposite 
case, the economy has to deal with work-intensive, short term investments. If the low 
transaction costs are present in the economy the tranfer of ownership from less efficient to 
more efficient economic subjects happens. In this circumstances economic activities based 
on newly structured property rights structure lead, ceteris paribus, to greater motivation for 
productive behaviour and to the decrease of rent-seeking the problem [14]. In contrast, 
insecure property rights often lead to inefficient allocation of resources. Uncertainity of the 
property rights is caused by personal connections of individuals and businesses with the 
ruling elite and these are used as substitutes for efficient "impersonal" formal rules. The 
result is that the economic success is determined by personal ties, relative power of 
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infuence and corruption within the politicized networks. In such conditions, economic 
efficiency may have a minor role, making the system inefficient in the economic and social 
way [37, p. 392]. 
Transactional costs could be observed as a separate mechanism in explaining  the 
property rights influence on economic efficiency. In that sense, an inefficient property 
rights system leads to large transaction costs in national economy due to the lack of the 
valuable characteristics of goods in public domain. As a consequence of inefficient property 
rights, possibilities for expansion of the labour division and further specialization are 
limited. This aspect is particularly evident if there are divergent community ideologies, 
which has a negative reflection on the level of transactional costs, i.e. on the weaker 
property rights protection. In addition, inefficient property rights, and the related high 
transaction costs, increase the rent seeking problem.This type of inefficiency is especially 
obvious in the developing and transition countries [14, pp. 149-150]. 
Summa summarum, if we observe the property rights influence on individual and 
organisational level, we may say that they speed up exchange and production: they 
influence in a positive way the decision-making approach to the resources usage; they 
optimize time horizon; they specify the allowed use of resources; they define transferability 
and direct the neto benefit and direct appropriation of net benefits [24]. 
4. THE DEPENDENCE OF THE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PRIVATE 
PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE QUALITY OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
Regarding the fact that in every social system property represents the central connetion 
between the individual and the state [1, p. 25], the system of political institutions represents 
an unavoidable element in establishing and providing the efficiency of the property rights 
system. In order for this to be achieved, the most serious problem the state faces is creating 
unambiguous property rights. Only such rules could provide maximum freedom to the 
economic agents when entering into contracts which are in line with their wishes. Once 
property rights are clear and protected the market process and its indigenous forces of 
supply and demand get the power to generate high social and economic values [22, p. 116]. 
The fundamental level in which it is possible to recognize the importance of political 
institutions is related to the fact that the political rules precede economic. Property rights 
and individual contracts are specified through the legislative framework and enforced in the 
process of making political and administrative decisions. However, the problem with 
establishing the efficient property rights system results in the fact that the structure of 
economic interests in society influences the political strucure. Considering that, we may say 
that the state of the given property rights structure and the characteristics of its implementation 
will be consistent with the specific set of political rules and its implementation [31, p. 48]. 
However, since the equilibrium does not imply at the same time efficiency. There are two 
possible solutions. One, although less likely, is the replacement of inefficient political 
institutions by efficient ones. The other solution is the attempt to modify them in an 
incremantal or significant way. The reasons for the inefficiency of the economic system 
come from the fact that political factors impede the institutionalization of property rights in 
a way that competitive markets can not function effectively [12, p. 200]. 
Property rights are not an immutable cathegory. They represent an individual's effort 
in protecting their property, but also an attempt of other economic subjects to take over in 
 Conceptual Framwork for Understanding the Influence of Efficient Protection of Private Property Rights  125 
whole or just in part some elements of the others' property rights. Because of this they 
have to be observed as a function of informal and formal private protection and especially 
public protection. The efficiency of later primarily depends upon the work of police and 
courts [5, p. 4]. Without a strong, accountable and committed state, it would not be 
possible to establish a functional property regime. 
Provided that all the instances, starting from the individuals included in exchange over 
the competitiveness in economic environment till court protection efficiency, funtion in a 
satisfactory manner, the efficiency of the property rights system would be ensured. 
However, economic markets, both in the past and present, are imperfect in numerous cases 
and characterized by high transaction costs. In such conditions, “spontaneous” and efficient 
property rights distribution is very difficult to achieve which directly reduces the economic 
potential. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that political markets are even less 
frequent than economic ones, if they exist at all. The reasons for that are multiple. Voters 
ignorance, incomplete information, predominat ideologic steretypes (that fortify subjective 
models, developed by the individuals in order to explain the environment and make 
choices) could additionally perpetuate inefficiences on political markets. In that case 
property rights will remain inappropriately protected and enforced [32]. 
State relevance is especially reflected in the altered circumstances of economic 
activities, in realtion to the previuos epoches. This is particularly apparent in relation to the 
changed role and influence of informal institutions. Namely, we could speak about 
effective property rights protection without formal institutional framework in the previous 
period, contemporary conditions do not make it possible. The development of the capital 
markets and large production systems with a large share of fixed costs influenced the 
evolution of political order, based on force, because more complex impersonal forms of 
exchange appeared. Personal acquaintances, voluntary restrictions in business and ostracism 
were not very effective and supportive mechanisms for property rights exchange, as it was 
the case in the past. However, the benefits which could be realized, if it comes to 
opportunistic behavior solely based on informal constraints, are sufficiently large in modern 
economies. This is why formal institutional structure became a necessary mechanism in 
protecting property rights of individuals and organisations [31]. 
It is particularly important to point out the complexity of the process of establishing 
an effective political system and proper functioning of political markets. Namely, 
mechanisms of measuring and executing transactions on political markets are far less 
efficient in comparison with those in economic markets. The subject of the exchange 
between voters and political parties are the promises for votes. In addition, the motivation 
of  voters to be informed is low, because it is not very likely in their perception that their 
voice, separately observed, is important. Additionally, the whole set of complex 
influences and interdependances causes always present uncertainty. The mechanism of the 
implementation of the political agreements is accompanied by a number of difficulties. 
Competition is far less effective than in economic markets. Regarding the fact that 
political system is the one that defines and enforces property rights, the logical outcome 
is that efficient economic markets are certainly not the rule [28]. 
Another important issue is the specific role and the importance of ideology and the 
state in maintaining and developing the institutions that particularly determine the 
domain of ownership. With the growth of exchange between economic agents, it becomes 
increasingly more specialized and complex. In those circumstances successful contracting 
requires the support of a third party. Strong political institutions are necessary because 
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their functioning comprises legal domain. However, states vary widely in the way they 
define property rights, individuals can see the political institutions more or less 
legitimate, depending on their ideology. The ideological component is especially 
significant in the context of an efficient property rights system for the following reasons. 
Namely, in case of high level of ideological consensus, aspiration towards opportunistic 
behaviour is minimal. In such conditions, property rights are protected in the best way. In 
the opposite situation, with low consensus, contract costs would very likely be higher and 
much larger effort would be needed in transacting. In that sense, ideological consensus 
might constitute an effective support to formal rules if not, at least partly, substitute for 
them [17, p. 115]. 
The relationship between political institutions and property rights is a result of a 
specific functional relationship that occurs between them. In concerto, according to the 
one of the premises of insitutional theory, there is no unique Pereto-optimal resources 
allocation, but only the specific results of structure of power or structure of rights. The 
resource allocation could be specified through a following functional causality. 
Widely observed, allocation of resources is the function of offer and demand on the 
market, whereby the two of the mentioned functions are the function of the de facto power. 
Power is, at the same time, the property rights function. Further derived relation reflects the 
fact that the property rights are the function of law. Law is the function of legislative and 
executive authority. Finally, executive and legislative authority are regarded as a function of 
a competition over the control of the state and its institutions, in order to protect certain 
interests in relation to the other interests [39, p. 6]. Previous description of multiple, circular 
and causal relation creates a possibility to notice the difficulty authorities (excutive, 
legislative, courtal) are faced with, in order to establish an efficient system of property 
rights protection and enforcement. In societies with merely economic interests, the problem 
of property rights would be formulated and solved in a relativly simple manner. However, 
the complex nature of political process and impacts of different interests are those 
preventing the discovery of rather simple solutions for this issue. The fact which cannot be 
overlooked is that property rights allocation reflects the structure of power in society.
1
 
Because of that, negotiations amog the transaction participants are always directed by 
innitial power distribution. For that very reason, it is necessay that those who establish the 
formal rules recognize these hazards and model the whole legislative framework in 
accordance with them. 
Having in mind the signifficance of political institutions in context of determining 
property rights efficiency, we have to identify the general political framework within the 
efficient property rights protection is possible. In that sense we could assert that 
democratic policies
2
 are a prerequisite for the efficient functioning of decentralized 
market economies, with clearly defined and implied property rights. This framework is 
the closest aproximation of adaptively efficient institutional structure. For that reason, it 
                                                 
1 There is an interesting interpretation which refers to the distribution of power and its reflections on property 
structure, especially public ownership. Namely, in some cases there is no reason, in terms of efficiency, for 
defining property over certain goods as public. However, public property is frequently the result of interest of 
those who represent authority and those who support it [19, p. 130]. 
2 Political regime where property rights are most efficiently protected is the rule of law. Though autocracies 
may ensure the economic growth in short term, the rule of law is an unavoidable mechanism in long term 
perpective. [29]. 
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is an essential part of development policy to create those rules which are central for 
establishing and protecting effective property rights. However, the problem about that is 
the knowledge imperfectness about how we should create those policies. An additional 
complicating circumstance is the research in this domain. It is principally concentrated on 
the USA and the Western market economies. On the other hand, in the places where those 
needs are most pronounced –in third world countries and former socialist economies, this 
aspect is insufficiently explored [29, pp. 366-367]. 
The previuos analysis can be summarized with the constatation that in the regime with 
positive transaction costs, legal frame becomes one of the main factors in determining 
economic performances. In the situation characterized by large transaction costs, contracts 
between the two sides are not likely to occur. In that case the costs are often higher than 
benefits of different property rights distribution [8, pp. 250-251]. The state, i.e. system of 
political institutions is doubly responsible in that process. It determines adequate definition 
of property rights, as well as their consistent and impartial implementation. If this is not the 
case, the economy will function below the level of production frontiers. 
6. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS  
IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH HISTORY 
It would be wrong to claim that the economic system predominantly based on private 
property is superior if we take the experiences of socialistic economies and their failure to 
provide adequate level of efficiency and welfare. The data go much further back in time. 
Two important civilisations that had left large inheritance to the contemporary world, i.e. 
The Greek states-cities and the Roman Empire were based on private property. Those 
were the first two civilisations with institutionally recognized private property, despite 
the fact that some fragmentary inscriptions indicate the existence of private property 
forms much earlier [10, p. 667]. Naturally, the existence of private property rights is an 
insufficient condition for reaching efficiency, and demands certain wider institutional 
backup. The special role belongs to continuity and stability of the economic and political 
system. The mentioned features were the crucial characteristics of helenic states and 
Roman society for a pretty long period of time, not only at the peak of their development. 
Historical archive provides a variety of evidence for the claim that property rights 
need to be adequately protected and enforced. Their influence on economic performances 
is especially reflected in situations where they are not adequatelly specificated. As an 
example of harmfullness of unclearly and inadequately defined property rights, we may 
state the feudal system. For a long period of time this system was not able at all to 
provide adequate incentives for efficient resource allocation. The reason for that was the 
manner in which the property rights structure was defined. A blurred system of shared 
responsibility and with it vague distribution of different aspects of property rights between 
the monarchs, aristocrats and peasants, generated a tremendous inefficiency and long term 
stagnation of the economic system. In manorial system (based on the relationship between 
the servant and the master), country folk, lords and the king had the property over the same 
land, although their rights were differently defined and often intertwined. In such a 
complicated system, property responsibilities were obviously ambiguously defined. This had 
disastrous consequences on economic effciency, not to mention immanent social disasters it 
invokes. Only with their radical redifinition and greater specification in terms of rights to 
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use, transfer or exclude others from use, came to their complete contribution to economic 
development, especially during the Industrial revolution. 
The specificity of the property rights system does not only reflect the necessity to be 
established gradually in time, but also significant time is needed until it begins to produce 
a full effect on economic activity. Medieval development of England distinctly confirms 
the fact that it takes a long period of time to establish an efficient system of private 
property protection. Namely, the appearance of Magna Carta
3
 in 1215 caused a relatively 
secure protection of property rights. This was especially the truth for those times. 
However, it took additional four centuries for it to reach political verification and more 
solid legal basis, which occurred with the Parlamentarism triumph in 1689. Unlike that, 
the political voluntarism and pretty insecure political and legal environment often ended 
with expropriation of property rights by the monarch, especially over financial resources. 
Magna Carta established institutional basis that produced political democracy and 
conditions for long term economic growth. This form was later reproduced and extended, 
with certain modifications, in British colonies in North America [19, p. 130]. 
Another ilustrative historical example, representing the great role of private property, 
refers to the USA. Namely, one of the highest USA achievements, in the early period of 
development, was adopting the special law in May, 1875. The law strongly promoted 
private property rights and this was of indispensable signifficance for further USA 
development [36, p. 147]. Although being suplemented and adapted several times during 
XX century, it has basically remained the same for a long period. From the present point 
of view, evolution and adaption of the above mentioned institutions will last for two 
centuries, but it is exactly they that made USA economic system superior in technological 
and economic manner during the whole XX century. Contrary to the experience with 
private property rights in the USA, there was strong opposition to property rights 
allocation toward private ownership in the late Middle Ages in France and Spain, which 
caused slower economic growth in these countries [24, p. 234]. 
Besides the hesitations or impossibility for adquate property rights definition, various 
historical experiences distinctly indicate the destructive consequences of violating the 
established property rights. The very representative example is the confiscation of 
property rights that took place in France in the XIV century. Namely, starting from 1307 
onwards Philip IV signifficantly assessed tax on the means of the knights templares 
(Ordre du Temple), in order to solve seriuos financial problems. Five years later, pope 
Clement V, exposed to high pressure from the French king, was obliged to dissolve the 
order and tranfer part of the money to Maltesian knights. The influence of these measures 
on the economy was very signifficant for this time, since these knights established the 
first known international bank system. It was based on strong military relations between 
the members of the order [6, p. 4560]. This kind of expropriation, like the future violations 
of property rules, caused stagnation in financial system development in France in 
comparation to the other European economies, especially the Dutch. If there is unequivocal, 
                                                 
3 It is interesting to say that Magna Carta was actually bought. Namely, the parliament rights to enact the laws, 
to investigate the cases of abuse and advise in national politics domain were practically bought from Edward I 
and Edward III. This money was borrowed to them so they could more easily wage the Hundred Years' War. 
New military technologies consisting of crossbow, bow and arrow, spear and gunpowder highly increased the 
war expenses. As a result, the British monarchs were obliged to change certain legislative rules, so they could 
have sufficent money to finance the war. Thereat, their throne depended on the outcome of the war. [19]. 
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empirically and theoretically confirmed connection between the financial system and 
economic growth, consequences in terms of missed opportunities can be gleaned. 
As a contemporary example that is often cited in terms of contrary conclusions to the 
assertation of the new institutional economics and property rights theory, i.e. their 
emphasise on the importance of private property rights, some authors cite the experiences of 
China. The reason for this consists in highlighting the fact that this country has specific 
ownership structure of the land resources, but also a significant number of companies in the 
non-private ownership regime. However, China's experience may be observed as additional 
argument or an excellent example, favouring the property rights theory and private property 
structure of economy. Namely, at the end of the 1970s, when the process of strong 
economic growth started, fundamenatal changes occurred in the institutional structure of 
Chinese economy. It provided individual instead of collective agricultural land cultivation, 
whereas economic subjects were given a possibility to make dicentralized instead of 
centralized decisions about resource allocation [42, p. 49]. It is obvious that this kind of 
institutional changes influenced the fundamental de facto change in the property rights 
system and basis changes in incentives, regardless of de jure property status of land or 
economic organisations. Besides that, new tendencies in Chinese economy confirm the fact 
that de jure property structure changes towards the dominant private property. To 
demontrate this, in 2000 around 80% of public and state companies in provincies and cities 
were privatized, whereas the rest were open to variuous cooperative relations with the 
private sector [43, p. 242]. The difficulties in the financial system were probably an 
additional factor that pushed privatization further. Namely, the amount of non-performing 
loans (NPL) in China represented huge burden for future economic growth. Although this 
phenomena is still present in Chinese economy and creates signifficant risks for the stability 
of the whole economy, privatization reduced the possible colapse of the financial system. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In the paper are presented the basic dimensions and mechanisms through which the 
property rights influence the efficiency of national economy. The conclusion could be 
summed up noting that the growth and development of the economic system are required 
as a necessary condition for clear determination and consistent enforcement of private 
property rights. Regarding the multiple aspects of establishing an effective and efficient 
property rights system, there is a decisive need to coordinate other institutional segments 
and public policies with those in property sphere. This includes especially the observation 
and investigation of the distribuitive, legal and wider institutional dependances.  
The advantages of the private property rights, regarding efficiency, are based on 
historical factors of social and economic system development, referring to the decrease of 
social compactness, increase of specialisation and higher organisational complexity. 
Besides that, other inherent characteristics of private property rights– in first line 
providing appropriate incentives for economic agents, are in the center of understanding 
all of the other growth factors, such as entrepreneurship or technical innovations. 
Efficient property rights enable and stimulate trade, which influences market expasion 
and the volume of investments. Trade and market expansion influence further division of 
labour and specialisation, which increases productivity and through that higher rate of 
economic growth and wealth creation. On the other hand, clearly defined property relations 
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and a stable institutional system reduce transaction costs, which increases transaction scope. 
Thanks to private property rights strong material incentives and a freedom of economic 
agents are provided. These are prerequisites for the increase of investments. 
An efficient property rights system is more the exception than the rule. The sources of 
such a state in this domain have to be explained. Most of them come from the political 
system. Inefficiencies are primarily the consequence of different principles prevailing in 
political and economical spheres. It refers, beside other things, to the complexity of the aims 
by political actors and simplificity of goals by economic agents. Political institutions based 
on the rule of the law are conditio sine qua non of the efficient market economy and its 
undisputable growth and development. 
The analysis of the variouos historical experiences confirms practical signifficance of 
property rights in the development of certain countries. The growth and high economic 
performance of the USA and the UK in the last century and a half could be largely 
interpreted as the consequence of the established private property rights system. The 
failures of France and Spain to establish credible public obligations of private property 
protection undoubtedly influenced relative stagnation of these systems. Flexibility and 
continuous development of contemorary Chinese economy, in terms of structure and 
property rights enforcement and protection,  represent the pivotal part of the explanation 
of its economic progress in the last forty years. 
The work also represents a solid basis for future research in several ways. There is a 
necessity for more complete comprehension and analysis of the influences from political 
sphere. Through empirical evaluation and analysis of the property rights influences, more 
detailed explanations about the relative power of mechanims effecting economic efficiency 
could be provided. Finally, studying the specific historical experiences in a large number of 
countries, uncovered by existing research, opens the possibility for explaining why and how 
weak property rights determine the stagnation of some countries in the long term. 
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KONCEPTUALNI OKVIR ZA RAZUMEVANJE UTICAJA 
EFIKASNE ZAŠTITE PRIVATNIH VLASNIČKIH PRAVA 
NA EKONOMSKU EFIKASNOST 
Vlasnička prava predstavljaju jednu od najznačajnijih strukturnih determinanti efikasnosti 
ekonomskog sistema. S obzirom da sadržinom zadiru u ukupnu institucionalnu, pravnu i distributivnu 
sferu, njihov uticaj na ekonomske performanse u nacionalnoj ekonomji je kompleksan i veliki. Specifična 
svojstva povezana sa socijalnim i ekonomskim karakteristikama nosilaca prava, generisanjem 
adekvatnijih podsticaja, potpunijim vrednovanjem, kao i individualnost, ekskluzivnost i slobodna 
transferabilnost, kombinovano dejstvo specijalizacije, produktivnosti, socijalne kompaktnosti i 
organizacione kompleksnosti, učinili su da privatna vlasnička prava generišu značajan ekonomski 
potencijal. Mehanizmi putem kojih se to ostvaruje se odnose na omogućavanje trgovine, povećanje 
obima tržišta i konkurencije, redukciju transkacionih troškova i obezbeđivanje adekvatne motivacije kod 
ekonomskih agenata. Nesavršenosti političkog procesa i iz njega rezultirajućih političkih institucija 
predstavljaju glavne uzroke neefikasne zaštite i sprovođenja vlasničkih prava. Specifična istorijska 
iskustva u razvoju pojedinih nacionalnih ekonomija na upečatljiv način potvrđuju njihova nesumljiva 
svojstva koja stimulišu propulzivnost nacionalne ekonomije i obezbeđuju pretpostavke dinamične 
ekonomske aktivnosti.  
Ključne reči: vlasnička prava, formalne institucije, ekonomska efikasnost, političke institucije, 
ekonomska istorija. 
